The short answer is no. Although the Plaintiffs, by and through their respective
counsel, may declared within their alleged Motions for Rehearing and Reconsideration
that based on changes in case law court orders she be changed or otherwise
vacated, there is nothing in the rules of civil procedure that would remotely
permit a court to do such a thing.
To be sure, there is only one instance of which I am aware, permitting
a court to revisit its
after all review and appellate deadlines have expired. Those final orders which are collaterally reviewed however are reviewed
in substantially limited circumstances. To begin, collateral review is
limited to criminal matters specifically, and among them capital criminal
cases in particular. It should be noted that even amongst those matters
which warrant a collateral review, the basis upon which a motion for collateral
review of a final order is granted, is considerably narrow. Final orders
in a capital case will only be overturned or reversed due to an alleged
change of law under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 when the alleged change: “(a)
emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional
in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance.
Most law changes of “fundamental significance” will fall within
the two broad categories described earlier.”
Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 931 (Fla. 1980). The final order as provided by a court
in the context of a lien foreclosure matter clearly doesn’t even
come close to the threshold Plaintiffs, and their counsel, would apparently
like courts to believe it does.
See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 & n.11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2240 & n.11, 60 L.Ed.2d
805 (1979) (footnote omitted);
See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1741-42, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965);
See also State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 518 (Fla. 2005),
as revised on denial of reh'g (Feb. 9, 2006).
Doctrine of Finality
The Courts throughout Florida or for that matter any justice system, employ
the well-established “Doctrine of Finality.” The Doctrine
of Finality ensures that just because Florida laws may change over time,
prior rulings are not then automatically reversed, for if they were, then
the finality of laws as enforced throughout the justice system and demanded
from the public at large, would simply be an illusion.
Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980). “The importance of finality in
any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated.
It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must,
at some point, come to an end. In terms of the availability of judicial
resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow effective
appellate review of other cases.”
Id. Again, the
Criminal Justice system,
unlike that of the Civil Law system, has established within it an opportunity for collateral review on issues
like that of death penalty sentences where a change of law, not legal
interpretation, is of such substance and consequence that the very underlying
Constitutionally of the prior final order as entered must be vacated.
See again State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 518 (Fla. 2005),
as revised on denial of reh'g (Feb. 9, 2006). Lastly, the law's concern for finality of decisions
is in no way diminished by the availability and utilization of a collateral
remedy such as Rule 3.850.
See again Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980). Nevertheless, based on the foregoing
Plaintiff’s argument is proven to be nothing more than mere smoke
and mirrors, if not a procedural blunder.
Insufficiency of Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing
Again motions for reconsideration are not permitted (a) once the Court
loses its jurisdiction through a dismissal. A Plaintiff’s recourse
is only to either request the Court rehear the matter in a timely filed
motion or otherwise appeal the motion. If they fail to do either of those
options, the Plaintiff still fails in their effort to overturn a final
order of dismissal with prejudice for the following reasons:
It is undisputed
what a motion for “rehearing” pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.530 applies to. A motion for rehearing only applies to final
judgments and “those orders that partake of the character of a final
i.e., orders that complete the judicial labor on a portion of the cause.”
Seigler v. Bell, 148 So. 3d 473, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting
Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So.2d 1386, 1390 n. 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)). However, the Supreme Court
of Florida has defined the occasions for
why a motion for rehearing should be filed, and it is that point which the
Defendant now seeks to parse out of the Plaintiff’s argument. (Emphasis added.)
The Florida Supreme Court held that “[a] petition for a rehearing
is a means afforded by rule to present to the court some point which it
overlooked or failed to consider by reason whereof its judgment is erroneous.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Lakeland, 94 Fla. 347, 1928);
Cole v. Cole, 130 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961) (citing
Hollywood, Inc., v. Clark, 153 Fla. 501, 1943)(holding “[a] prime function of a petition for
rehearing is to present to the trial court some point which it overlooked
or failed to consider, which renders the decree inequitable and erroneous.”)).
However, “[a] motion …for rehearing must state the grounds
on which it is based with particularity. It must direct the attention
of the court to the particular error or omission …
to which [the] objection is made.” (Emphasis added).
Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure, §26:1, 2007 Edition, (citing
Kahn v. Delaware Securities Corporation, 114 Fla. 32 (1934).
The grounds for a motion for rehearing are quite narrow. Only the following
categories are applicable for a motion for rehearing: (1) Errors on the
face of the record; (2) Errors committed during the trial, including rulings
admitting or excluding evidence and jury instructions; (3) Surprise; and
(4) Newly discovered evidence.
Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure, §26:1, 2007 Edition, citing
Braznell v. Braznell, 140 Fla. 192 (1939)). Additionally, “[t]he factual grounds of a
motion for new trial or for rehearing are not self-verifying.
They require proof unless shown by the record.” (Emphasis added).
Trawick’s Florida Practice and Procedure, §26:1, 2007 Edition, citing
Young v. State, 140 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1962)).
If a Plaintiff has not made any claim of error on the face of the record
and the Plaintiff seeks only to restate arguments that were already presented
at a prior final hearing, then Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing
is insufficient as a matter of law. Be careful, if a Plaintiff’s
sole line of support for their conduct in inducing a court to subject
itself to reversible error is that case law from a respective District
Court of Appeal now interprets the law in a distinguishable fashion from
prior case law in the same District.
Allard v. Al-Nayem Intern., Inc., 59 So.3d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). In
Allard, the appellate court held that “[t]he trial court improperly granted
a rehearing. “Rehearing is not intended as a device to present additional evidence that
was available, although not presented.” (Emphasis added).
see also St. Petersburg Hous. Auth. v. J.R. Dev., 706 So.2d 1377, 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)).
Allard, the plaintiff sued for breach of a warranty deed and “consciously
elected to proceed upon…what was ultimately determined to be an
invalid theory of damages.”
Id. The Court determined that because alternative theories of damages were
available and the plaintiff chose not to rely upon them, a rehearing to
introduce evidence that was available although not presented would be
improper. Unquestionably, ruling in favor of a bank on any issue in their
motion for rehearing, would invariably invite reversible error in light
of the decade’s worth of codified rules and law concerning the improper
request made by a Plaintiff and their counsel.
See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 57.105 (2016);
Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23, 27 (Fla. 2013).
 The deadlines referred to here are: (a) 15 days for motions for rehearing
pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530, and (b) 30 days for appeal.
See also ABA Standards Relating To Post-Conviction Remedies 3 (Approv. Draft 1968)
(“A general principle underlying these standards is that once an
issue of fact or law has been finally determined, that adjudication ought
to be final and binding.”).